Information Economics, the Translation Profession and Translator Certification
This paper uses the theoretical framework of information economics to examine why the status of professional translators has been low. Traditionally, it has been believed that good translators have left the translation profession for other professions because they are underpaid and their working conditions are generally poor. This sounds reasonable but it is also highly evaluative, which makes testing and analysis impossible. This author employs the concepts of asymmetric information and signaling mechanism to provide an alternative explanation. According to this theory, if properly designed, a translator certification system can act as an effective signal in the translation market.
A small-scale pilot questionnaire study of professional translators was conducted to look at the working conditions of translators in different parts of the world and whether translators thought that a certification system would have an effect on the pay and working conditions of professional translators. Answers to the second question were mixed. Possible reasons for this might be: (1) The translation market is segmented and heterogeneous; (2) There is confusion between licensing and certification; (3) The scale of a professional association has an effect on the credibility of a certification system. A translator certification system, if it is to function as a credible signal of translator quality, must be combined with effective conduct regulation and continued professional development.
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